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Introduction
Hyo Yoon Kang and Sara Kendall
Over the last decade there has been an increased interest in materiality 
within legal scholarship, as well as in related disciplines that study 
law and its practices. Much of it has accounted for the concrete 
and complex manifestations of law through various materials: from 
formats of inscription to other mediated devices, such as files and 
images, to bodies and spaces upon and through which law acts. Yet the 
terms ‘matter’, ‘materials’ and ‘materiality’ are employed in divergent 
ways across different works, and often without clear distinctions or 
theoretical delineations.1 This special issue begins from proposing 
a differentiated understanding of these terms in relation to law and 
legal scholarship, and embeds them in a broader conception of legality, 
unpacking their premises and implications. 
After developing the working definitions of matters, materials and 
legal materiality outlined below, we invited contributors from a range of 
disciplines – including law, anthropology, philosophy, political theory 
and literature – to critically engage through matters or materials that 
they have chosen. The following collection of articles, essays and a poem 
is an experimental and open-ended form of production, illustrating the 
benefits and challenges of legal materiality as a mode of inquiry. As 
these contributions show, the working definitions of these terms are 
not always easy to separate and sometimes recalcitrantly collapse into 
each other. Yet distinguishing between matters (problematisations) 
and materials (their constitutive parts) helps to illuminate law's actual 
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workings by identifying and analyzing the composition and forms that 
enact legality, instead of confining critique to a general level which 
leaves 'law' intact as an abstract black box.
1 Why materiality?
Other disciplines have undergone ‘material turns’ to the point that 
works employing a materialist approach are included in the canons 
of their disciplines. The ‘materials’ in such turns in other disciplines, 
as in anthropology, history of science or political theory, are particular 
practices and claims, artefacts, organisms and physical settings, distinct 
from broad categories such as ‘culture’, ‘society’, ‘science’ or ‘politics’.2 
Inspirations for such a turn in law are diverse, but much is owed to 
Cornelia Vismann’s pioneering work at the intersection of legal history 
and media studies (2001, 2008, 2011, 2012), which considered the 
legality of concrete media, such as files or films, rather than categorical 
accounts of legal doctrinal forms. In Anglophone legal scholarship, 
theoretical discussions of what materiality may mean in relation to 
law have been offered by scholars building upon the work of Foucault, 
Latour,  Vismann (Pottage 2012) and Benjamin (Tomlins 2010).3  We 
have traced the different strands of materiality and notions of legal 
materiality elsewhere (Kang 2018; Kang and Kendall 2019); here we 
illustrate what a focus on materiality could offer. 
We understand the turn to materials as a reaction and a possible 
way out of the postmodern conundrum of the self-referentiality of 
social and historicist critique. God is dead, but it would seem so 
is society. If there is nothing outside the social, which means that 
law forms part of the very thing by which it is often explained, any 
explanations of the ‘legal’ by reference to the ‘social’ or ‘political’ result 
in dedifferentiation (Schlag 2009). The risk of abstract explanations in 
legal scholarship – for example, explaining the ‘legal’ by reference to 
the ‘social’ or ‘economic’ — is that they flatten the explanatory field, 
as with the economic determinism of orthodox Marxist historical 
materialism or the political determinism of Critical Legal Studies. 
Biopolitics, markets, and racism cannot be explained by reference to 
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other abstract categories, such as power, because they already form part 
of these categories. Explaining neoliberalism through capital, or politics 
through power, or indeed law through politics does not contribute much 
to an understanding of what these labels themselves consist of, how they 
come about, and the concrete practices that they entail. Legal concepts 
such as property or jurisdiction cannot be explained by references to 
sovereignty or territory. These abstract categories can be rendered 
more concrete and their compositions can be unpacked to open them 
to greater critical potential. A legal materialist approach reintroduces 
differentiation into legal analysis by focusing on the artefacts, practices, 
formats and settings in and through which law acts and is enacted. A 
legal materialist approach turns from knowledge of legal concepts (as 
with the doctrinal study of law) to legal ways of knowing and to the 
materials that law draws upon.
Approaching law in a materialist way calls for reflecting upon the 
ways in which we can identify the constitutive parts of a legal concept by 
situating our own viewpoint. It then involves analysis and interpretive 
reconstruction, followed by a critical assessment of the resulting picture 
of, for example, jurisdiction as a ‘whole’ whilst taking into account 
the unstable composition of the parts.4 Assuming a deconstructivist 
ontology and an inductive epistemology, the legal materialist approach 
proposes to look at the concrete composition of abstract legal categories, 
such as evidence, honor or human rights. Rather than assuming an 
overarching or unifying theory of ‘Law’ or legality, this approach offers 
a reconstruction of how specific legal issues are stabilised in the absence 
of such an outside referent. Through attending to the composition of 
specific assemblages, and the techniques and relations they entail, a 
legal materialist approach has the potential to generate more clarity 
for understanding what counts as legal knowledge and how legality 
materializes.
The meanings and uses of materiality in legal scholarship have 
been varied and based on divergent understandings of matter and 
materials. For example, some strands of legal scholarship understand 
materiality to denote physical objects or artefacts to be taken as symbols 
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or allegories of law, an approach that reads law into objects (Hohmann 
and Joyce 2018). Other scholars of law work with new materialist 
theories, such as insights from the cognitive sciences concerning 
embodied and distributed minds, as well as socialized bodies (Miller 
2013). The material turn in legal scholarship has been more pronounced 
in some legal subfields than in others. This has particularly been 
the case in subfields that take up challenges to or the breakdown of 
existing legal concepts. For example, biotechnological entities pose 
challenges to legal conceptions of personhood and invention, and 
the proliferation of digital data contests conceptions of privacy and 
jurisdiction. In these cases the scholar faces two distinct materialities: 
not only the materiality of the novel thing, but also the materiality of 
legal categories that depend upon techniques of legal representation. 
Other legal scholars have traced how law shapes physical matters 
and their meanings, such as plants, rather than arguing that physical 
materials determine law (Sherman 2008). Scholars in other disciplines, 
particularly anthropology, sociology, science and technology studies 
(STS), and media studies, have also studied law as (partially) materially 
mediated constructions (Scheffer 2004, Biagioli 2006, Krajewski & 
Vismann 2007, Leach 2008, Strathern 2010, Lezaun 2012). 
2 Conceptualising legal materiality 
Building upon previous work on materiality in law and legal scholarship, 
we introduce a specific understanding of legal materiality that denotes 
the process or composition by which matters turn into legal concerns 
or problematisations through materials, such as texts, forms, formats, 
techniques, and physical as well as immaterial entities. This approach 
seeks to understand how different materials articulate and shape legal 
difference. Yet the terms ‘material’ and ‘matter are often misunderstood 
as physical ‘things’. By contrast, we propose an understanding of these 
terms that moves beyond instrumentalising objects as symbols or tools 
of and for law, and also beyond ascribing causal agency to objects and 
things without attending to their specific enlisting within law as well 
as their histories outside the legal realm (Kang 2018). We contend 
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that some of these approaches take a reductive view of law, treating 
it as a black box or reading it into objects without accounting for the 
ways in which law is a specific mode of knowledge that transforms 
certain objects into legal materials in order to deliberate over ‘matters 
of concern’ to law.5 Moreover, some of the legal transpositions of actor 
network theory and new materialism also adopt a reductive view of 
matters and materials as self-evident and self-explanatory without 
accounting for the complex processes, particular knowledge practices 
and techniques which make them appear (for example, with image and 
sound). Our proposed approach takes care not to collapse into either a 
materialist determinism or a hermeneutic self-referentiality, and a legal 
materialist mode of inquiry would mediate between these two poles. 
In thinking through what is specific about legal materiality – as 
opposed to physical materiality or other kinds of materialities – we 
have needed to address the question of legal ontology. Some of our 
interlocutors have explicitly grappled with the question ‘what is law?’, 
such as Marianne Constable in relation to legal speech (2014) and 
Alain Pottage asking about law as the unknown of ‘the materiality of 
what?’ (2012). Our approach takes their work as departure points and 
extends them into an understanding of legal materiality, an approach 
which makes a theoretical argument defining a specific notion of legal 
materiality as well as offering an analytical perspective that shows 
the constitution of matters of concern and the role of materials in 
law. Legal materiality as a mode of analysis does not offer a unifying 
theory of legal causality or meaning, but instead serves as a mode of 
tracing and differentiating between the fluctuating elements, internal 
structures and compositional arrangement of a particular matter of 
law. Legal materiality is therefore concerned with the concrete steps 
of how something comes to matter (in the sense of a verb) rather than 
in the sense of a physical object. 
We propose some working definitions of matter, materials and 
materiality specifically in relation to law. As with Scheffer and 
Pottage, who draw on Foucault, we understand ‘law’ not as a material 
phenomenon, but rather as the difference attributed to a legal matter or 
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problem as distinctly legal. This difference is generated in the moment of 
attributing a legal quality to a matter. Legal difference, or the attribution 
of ‘legal’, is the mode of veridiction specific to law. This builds upon 
Foucault’s general conception of énoncé, a discursive form that is often 
translated as ‘statement’ or ‘utterance’ (1972).6 Latour also builds upon 
this particular understanding of law as an autonomous mode of distinct 
enunciations, a singular ‘mode of existence’. He contends that law is 
‘recognized as a domain that can be isolated from the rest… it has its 
own mode of veridiction… universally acknowledged as capable of 
distinguishing truth from falsity in its own way’ (2013: 358-9). Legal 
meaning is a distinct socially constructed attribution of meaning that 
draws and enacts a difference between the legal and the non-legal. 
‘Law’ does not exist prior to or outside such an act of differentiation.
Law’s distinctness then arises by differentiating matters into ‘legal 
matters’. The attribution of a distinct ‘legal’ difference is a linguistic 
or – if outside human language, other communicative7 – act of 
interpretation, which turns matters into arguments or claims. Despite 
their physical presence, things may not matter as ‘legal matters’ or 
may not be perceived as relevant for law, and they may only become 
legal matters under distinct conditions and material mediations. If a 
matter is transformed into a legal matter (through the attribution of 
legal difference), then it becomes a matter of concern to law. In order 
for a matter to be legally relevant, there has to be a legally recognizable 
problem; in other words, it has to have a legal context so that it can 
be perceived and expressed in legal language. Legal matters are 
therefore problematisations in Foucault’s sense: ‘the set of discursive or 
nondiscursive practices that makes something enter into the play of the 
true and false, and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether under 
the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, 
etc.)’ (1988: 157). Latour’s ‘regime of enunciation’, Vismann’s ‘cultural 
techniques of distinction’ or Luhmann’s idea of coded communication 
are similar to Foucault’s notion of problematisation, although these 
theorists differ in their understanding of the referent(s) of the legal 
mode of veridiction. A legal materialist study would need to consider the 
distinct conditions under which law recognizes and represents matters 
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of concern – legal matters – and the distinct mode in which it mobilizes 
materials. How do certain (social, economic, cultural, environmental) 
matters become legal matters?  Legal materials mediate and transform 
matters into distinctly legal matters.  For example, manuals and 
restatements of law are legal materials, whereas jurisdictional claims 
are a legal matter of concern. Without legal materials, matters are not 
intelligible to law. 
Legal materials materialize legal difference, but they are distinct 
from legal matters. Whereas legal matters are not physical but are 
rather conceptual, legal materials may be physical or intangible. Legal 
materials’ defining features are that they are constitutive and functional; 
they are materials for the making of legal meaning. Legal materials 
include techniques (different forms and genres), modes of representation 
(different media, textual and non-textual), bureaucratic arrangements, 
and physical spaces in which legal matters are discussed. Materials are 
only legal materials insofar as they contribute to the making of legal 
meaning, such as a the qualified space of a courtroom; but they also 
may have purposes outside of the distinct regime of enunciation that 
is law; for example, when the courtroom is used in other functions or 
transformed into a residential building. Legal materials can be dormant 
(closed criminal case files in archives, abandoned and discarded patent 
applications), but they can also be active (texts of rulings, rules for 
statutory interpretation, drafting techniques, mapped borders, animals, 
humans, mediums of evidence). Legal materials do not always matter 
(in the sense of a verb). For example, a notebook might be kept by a 
researcher for her own records, but it becomes a legal material if she has 
to claim priority for the novelty of an invention in patent law. A legal 
materialist approach makes visible the materials through which law 
operates and shows how they are enlisted in the production of legality. 
For Foucault and Luhmann, however, materials do not determine or 
‘make’ law; causation works the other way around, as the legal énoncé 
turns certain things into legal materials. The legal énoncé is performed 
and enacted in a Foucaultian dispositif consisting of materials.8 Perhaps 
more materialist than Latour, Foucault and Luhmann, Cornelia 
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Vismann conceived and studied materials as law’s constitutive media 
that inform the ways in which a legal matter is revealed. We believe 
that the turn to materials is particularly useful if the legal matter itself 
is hard to figure, especially when it seems even more immaterial than 
other matters, as with intellectual property or jurisdiction. If there is 
no established legal matter or it is in the process of emerging, a legal 
materialist mode of inquiry looks for the materials that make up the 
‘law’; that is, the means by which legal difference is produced. 
Lastly, we distinguish legal matters from law’s objects or legal 
objects, where the nature of legality is taken as given. In some scholarly 
approaches it would appear that potentially anything can be read as a 
legal object, but its manner of legal materialization and qualification – 
how legal difference manifests – is rarely considered. We contend that 
objects are only legal matters of concern as far as they are taken as or 
mediated by legal materials. We do not assume that tactile things and 
artefacts are self-evident to law simply because they physically exist. 
Their physicality would need to be translated into a legal context in 
order to be perceived as a legal material, and they only become material 
to law under distinct conditions. Matters of law are not tactile or 
physical, but rather issues, problematisations or concerns. For example, 
a matter of law is not land, but rather territory, jurisdiction, property 
or sovereignty. A piece of music itself is not a matter of concern to 
law, but it becomes one if it gets implicated in questions of authorship, 
copyright or access. A legal material may be a physical object, such as 
a book, but also may be an oral testimony or a technique, such as rules 
of procedure. Building upon these distinctions between legal matters 
and legal materials, we propose an understanding of law as a distinct 
mode of producing matters of concern through enlisting materials, 
whether physical or intangible.
3 Thinking through law’s matters and materials 
This special issue began from an experimental approach, and 
contributors’ engagements ranged from building upon the project’s 
points of departure to offering different ways of thinking through 
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legal materiality. Their articles and essays take up a diverse set of 
matters, from overtly legal examples – as with evidence, title, justice, 
and distinction – to considerations of knowledge, hope, and honor 
as they relate to legal forms. The materials under consideration are 
equally diverse, drawing on texts such as novels, source code, statutory 
language, a case concerning jars of jam, early international law treatises, 
prefaces, and postcards (literal and metaphorical), as well as practices 
such as expert testimony, oral history, duels, military targeting, and 
even changes of heart. Not all contributors shared our terminology 
and premises, and some contributions reveal what eludes or unsettles 
law and its juridical forms. 
For example, in James Leach’s opening account, ‘Documents against 
“Knowledge”’, he warns against treating law as a transcendent form, 
‘a “reality” that is inscribed in, makes use of, and appears through 
materials’. Law exists within practices, Leach contends, and some of 
these practices may in fact subvert a transcendent vision of law’s authority 
and authoritativeness, as when people of the Rai Coast of Papua New 
Guinea ‘do’ knowledge through the production of documents that are 
not bound to a transcendent conception of what lies outside the activity 
of their making. What Pierre Legendre has described elsewhere as 
‘legal delineation’ and ‘the juridical space of structure’ that transmits 
content and power over time actually presumes an occidental approach 
to knowledge, a knowledge that is inhabited through texts and tied to 
authoritative forms (Legendre 1997: 71). Leach unsettles such framings 
by showing how they presuppose a transcendent form of knowledge 
inscribed in law through various (textual) materials, but that there 
are other cosmologies that bear ‘attributes’ of legality. Jill Stauffer’s 
contribution also reveals the cultural particularity of western legal 
forms by examining the encounter between a Canadian jurisdiction 
and indigenous claims to title based on songs, stories, and objects, 
arguing that what constitutes ‘legal’ materials should be expanded to 
avoid reinscribing colonial relations within and through law. These 
two opening pieces illustrate the importance of materials in thinking 
through what constitutes legality, and they raise the ethical question 
of how to avoid the imposition of dominant legal cosmologies through 
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accepted ‘legal’ materials.
Wouter Werner’s contribution takes up a legal material by turning 
to what Gerard Genette calls ‘paratextual elements’, focusing on the 
role of the preface in international law. If the first two contributions 
attempt to unsettle the givenness of what is considered ‘legal’ in the 
first place, revealing its colonial presumptions, Werner approaches 
the question of how legal authority is produced from within textual 
practices. As mediations between text and context, prefaces situate 
what follows within a tradition and may in fact produce and shore up 
the structure of authorship, as with the example of Vitoria’s De Indis, 
a central text in the historical emergence of the discipline. An excerpt 
from Fabian Steinhauer’s work follows as a bridge between these first 
three accounts of the legality at stake within legal materiality, and 
advances ‘cultural techniques of law’ as an approach between law, 
media studies, and cultural studies. Steinhauer contends that such an 
approach should be ‘parajuridical’, moving beyond law’s medium of 
language and attending to the ways in which law attempts (and fails) 
to differentiate itself from what it posits as its outside.
Following Steinhauer’s call to explore these cultural techniques, 
Kamari Clarke and Sara Kendall ’s contribution considers the 
incorporation of geospatial technologies as legal materials in 
international criminal tribunals, focusing on the matter of evidence as 
a highly regulated field of practice. Through focusing on expert witness 
testimony before the International Criminal Court, they offer an 
account of ‘ juridical mediation’ that illustrates how satellite images and 
practices of expert reading are conscripted into legal processes that ‘see’ 
things otherwise. Markus Krajewski explores the juridical character of 
algorithms as a precedential mode of reasoning, contending that they 
foster a kind of closure or codification as legal materials. Against this 
view of algorithmic opaqueness, he advances the idea of ‘source code 
critique’ that would examine the ‘interplay of code and commentary’, 
rendering algorithms more transparent through practices of reading 
and commentary that are familiar within the legal field, where codes (of 
law) have been compiled through accumulated commentaries over time.
11
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An excerpt from Tung-Hui Hu’s poem Punishment: An Index 
recounts the various ways that humans have sought to attribute 
responsibility to inanimate objects, flogging and banishing bells, 
placing ‘homicidal objects’ on trial, and impounding cars for their 
complicity in moral failures. Hyo Yoon Kang takes up the broader 
problem of materializing abstract matters in her contribution on 
‘climate justice’, where attempts to litigate climate change as human 
rights violations run up against the limits posed by differing scales 
of knowledge and legal formats. Kang employs a legal materialist 
approach of seeing the legal enactment of ‘climate justice’ through the 
elements that comprise it. Matei Candea’s contribution considers the 
matter of honour, ‘a recalcitrant matter of law’, which he claims comes to 
matter for French law through the transformation of the duel – and its 
material traces of violence and bodily harm – into libel. The emergence 
of late nineteenth century libel law – still in use today – serves as the 
textual location of honour, more accurately viewed as the extension 
of the duel’s concern with its violation rather than a formalisation 
of a social code concerned with truth. Stuart Murray’s intervention 
explores how life appears as a matter for law, arguing that both life 
and law are ‘technological artefacts of biopolitical power’ that exceed 
what a legal materialist approach can address. Through a reading of 
Milan Kundera’s novel The Joke and the production of hope within the 
fertility industry, Murray argues that the ‘immaterial’ rhetorical force 
of language and speculative futures determine law, which he conceives 
as a sovereign-juridical tool of ‘biopower’.
Mahmoud Keshavarz and Amin Parsa show how materials 
imbued with legal meanings are consequential by considering the role 
of military uniforms in establishing the principle of distinction as a 
matter of concern to (international) law. Their contribution illustrates 
how the law of armed conflict establishes a domain of persuasion in 
which signs and markers used on the battlefield enables the distinction 
between civilian and military targets. The matter of legitimate 
targeting is rendered intelligible through the material of the uniform, 
which is troubled by the absence of such insignia in contemporary 
asymmetric warfare. James Martel’s contribution focuses on law’s 
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fraught entanglements with objects by reading Franz Kafka’s The Trial 
together with a US supreme court case. Following Walter Benjamin 
(and Kafka), Martel shows how law lacks a clear ontological basis for 
its authority and must rely upon objects to assert itself; when these 
objects prove recalcitrant, as with the case of ‘imitation jam’, law’s 
vulnerability and dependence are revealed as a foil to its ‘powerful 
desire to be read otherwise’.
The last two contributions consider mediations through which 
law is altered, both textually and materially. The collaborative work 
between Marie-Andree Jacob and Anna Macdonald brings together 
perspectives from legal scholarship and artistic practice to consider 
the typographical line of the strikethrough as an embodied force, 
a performance of the ‘change of heart’ that the inscription enacts. 
Marianne Constable’s account of the bureaucratic and cultural lives of 
the paper shredder illustrates its entanglements with law’s matters of 
evidence and privacy. Both show how materials such as bodies, texts, 
inscription devices and machines move in and out of relations with law 
in dynamics that manifest through material traces:  the strikethrough 
marking a change that lingers, the shredded document as a remainder.
Endnotes
1. Notable exceptions include, in particular, Pierre Legendre, Cornelia 
Vismann, Alain Pottage, and Christopher Tomlins, who have 
different understandings of materiality, particularly in relation to 
the level of analysis at which the notion of materiality would be 
employed in legal scholarship (for example,  for an analysis of a 
contemporary development as it stabilizes into something ‘legal’, 
or as a legal historical method of montage). 
2. There are too many examples to list, but here we list some which 
contain thoughtful discussions and conceptualization of an 
interpretive-materialist approach and the rich analysis which such 
an approach can yield: in anthropology: Gell 1998, Latour 1979; in 
political theory: Mitchell 2013;  in history of sciences: Rheinberger 
1997, Daston ed 2000.
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3. These have been informed by Cornelia Vismann’s work on law and 
media studies and Bruno Latour’s ethnography of Conseil d’Etat 
(2010). 
4. With the concept of jurisdiction, for example, the observer’s 
epistemological task of self-reflection is to trace how the abstract 
idea of jurisdiction is brought into being by delineating and 
qualifying the relations amongst constitutive parts that comprise it. 
5. The phrase is often associated with Latour (2004). 
6. Pottage (2012) draws on Thomas Scheffer’s (2004) observation 
that the énoncé ‘is material because it affords certain possibilities 
of “reinscription and transcription”’ (169).
7. For example, the study of algorithmic governmentality and 
regulatory frameworks as a legal matter does not engage with 
language expressing law, but rather with other legal materials, 
such as numbers and probability calculations. With regard to these 
modes of communication, Luhmann’s (1998) understanding of an 
ecology of communication in which the ‘code’ of law is one out of 
many contingent modes of communications may work as a better 
analytical framework. 
8. Pottage (2012) follows Foucault’s notion of the dispositif and 
proposes a definition of legal materiality as a heterogeneous 
dispositif composed of discourses (‘regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philantropic arguments’) and other human constructions 
(‘institutions, architectural formations’). 
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